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A significant number of Pope Alexander III’s decretal letters were incorporated into the Liber 
Extra becoming part of a cohesive juridical work that would remain as the principal source of 
Canon Law well into the Twentieth Century. If his direct association with the School of Bolo-
gna and Master Gratian is disputed (Noonan, 1977), the presence of juridical elements in his 
writings is undeniable. In face of the discussions surrounding Alexander III’s background, the 
present text analyzes the use of juridical formulas and terms in some of the pope’s decretals as 
well as his references to works of canon law, particularly to Gratian’s Decretum. 
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1. Alexander III and decretal law
The role of decretals, letters from the pope answering to demands and 
interrogations coming from outside the Holy See, in the formation and con-
solidation of Canon Law has been long discussed by historiography. One of 
the most important names in the development of what would later come to be 
called “new law”, as opposed to “old law” - represented by Gratian’s Decretum 
and formed by patristic sources, the Holy Scripture, pope’s letters and the 
canons of councils held prior to 1140 – was pope Alexander III, who was at the 
head of the Curia for more than twenty years (1159-1181). However, historians 
have frequently questioned whether the decretals can be seen as examples of 
an effort at juridical systematization or not1.
1 Many authors have dedicated their studies to this topic. Among these works we can highli-
ght collections that bring together many articles and offer an overview of the main discussions 
* Many of the reflections developed in this text were improved by the debates raised during the 
symposium’s sessions. I would particularly like to thank Professors Peter D. Clarke, Diego Qua-
glioni, Michel Lauwers, and Barbara Bombi for their thought-provoking questions. My deepest 
gratitude, as well, to Professors Rosa Maria Dessì and Laura Gaffuri who generously accepted 
my contribution.
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A decretal is not a law. It is not, in most cases, initiated by the papacy, but 
is rather a reaction to a request or question coming from outside the curia. 
In its original conception, the decretal has no intention of creating a precept 
of universal application. Its function is to deal with or solve a specific case 
in light of the known circumstances, even in the cases in which it is actually 
following pre-existing canons. According to Gérard Fransen, a decretal has 
nothing more than a decisive and constraining value to the case in question, 
even though it may come to create grounds for a jurisprudential precedent2. 
This view of decretals, along with documentary analysis that put in check the 
once-accepted theory that Alexander III had been a canon law professor in 
Bologna, have made scholars question the real weight of juridical elements in 
the pope’s production. 
The present text aims to bring this debate once more to light supporting 
the idea that, although Alexander III was probably not a canon law scholar, 
the production of the Holy See during his pontificate was guided by notions 
of law and fed upon the discussion of canonists from the twelfth century. In 
order to establish this point, it is imperative to recover some elements of the 
historiographical debate involving the identity of Pope Alexander III. There-
fore, we will begin with and overview of the historiography concerning the 
notion of “lawyer pope” in Alexander III, followed by remarks from the pon-
tiff’s contemporaries regarding his abilities and practices. Finally, we propose 
an analysis of some elements in the decretals that could contribute to the dis-
cussion of the opposition (perhaps excessively unnatural) between legislator/
jurist and theologian.
2. The historiographical debate
«There is no evidence that Alexander <III> ever studied law. By training 
he was a theologian, not a lawyer»3, Colin Morris wrote in 2001. The author 
was answering a long-standing tradition that associated Pope Alexander III, 
named Rolandus, to an unknown canonist, also named Rolandus, who had 
supposedly been a professor in Bologna alongside Gratian in the early twelfth 
century. This tradition, initiated in the mid-nineteenth century, helped to 
such as Kuttner, Studies; Gaudemet, La formation du droit canonique; Fransen, Canones et 
Quaestiones; Duggan, Decretals and the creation of “New Law”, and Duggan, Twelfth-century 
decretal collections; Gilchrist, Canon law; Bishops, texts, and the use of Canon; Brundage, Me-
dieval Canon Law; Blumenthal, Papal Reform; The history of medieval canon law; Law as 
profession. The discussion has recently widened to the forms of use of legal documents and the 
definitions of juridical action and systems. In this context, we highlight the ideas presented in 
the special number Histoire et droit, in «Annales - Histoire, Sciences Sociales», 57 (2002), 6; 
Gauvard et al., Les normes, among others. 
2 Fransen, Les Décrétales et les Collections de Décrétales. This idea is further corroborated in 
other works by Fransen, particularly in articles present in Canones et Quaestiones.
3 Morris, The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church, p. 402.
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shape the image of the pope and marked his association to the figure of a 
“lawyer pope”. The absence of information on Alexander’s life prior to his 
becoming pope and a series of misinterpretations helped to consolidate this 
theory.
The first element leading to the notion of lawyer pope was, evidently, the 
impressive production of “legal” documents during the pontificate of Alexan-
der III and the incorporation of the majority of his known decretal letters into 
canonical collections4. Even more remarkable is this presence of Alexander’s 
decretals in the Decretals of Gregory IX (Liber Extra). The collection com-
piled in 1234 deals with issues such as the Church’s organization and hier-
archy, the administration of justice, clerics’ behavior and moral, marriage, 
properties, benefits, among others. It contains a total of 1971 canons of which 
470 belong to Alexander III. The only pope that was more used is Innocent 
III (1198-1216) who is counted 685 times in the collection5. Clearly Alexan-
der III’s contribution to the consolidation of a rescriptum system, in which 
normative determinations were given in response to petitions coming from 
outside the See is undeniable6. 
This massive production of decretals and their subsequent incorporation 
to the collections led scholars to suppose that Alexander III must have had 
some kind of legal training. The problem was that there was virtually no in-
formation on his life prior to his joining of the papal See during the pontificate 
of Eugene III (around 1149), since his biographer, Boso, did not provide us 
with any information beyond his name, Roland, his birthplace, Siena, and 
his father’s name, Rainulfus. But in 1859, from the discovery of a manuscript 
entitled Stroma, which was a commentary on Gratian’s Decretum, Friedrich 
Maassen, supposed that the Rolandus to whom the text was attributed was 
the same who would become pope a few years later. In 1885, a new text by a 
certain Rolandus was also attributed by Heinrich Denifle to Alexander III, 
the Sententiae. From these two discoveries it was deduced that Alexander III 
had been a canon law professor in Bologna at around the same time as Gra-
tian and that these works were his first compositions. This would explain the 
See’s predilection for legal matters and the extensive production of decretal 
letters. Marcel Pacaut in his studies about the pope, for example, based his 
4 The estimated total number of decretals produced during the pontificate of Alexander III is 
of 713, according to Duggan, Decretals and the creation of “New Law”, p. 107. The first works 
which compiled decretals from Alexander III can be dated to the end of his pontificate, for ex-
ample with the Appendix Concilii Lateranensis whose approximate date of composition ranges 
from 1181-1185. Friedberg, Die Canones-sammlungen zwischen Gratian und Bernhard von 
Pavia. Many other so-called primitive collections include decretals from Alexander III which 
were not necessarily incorporated into the Liber Extra. Robert Sommerville offers a list of these 
collections in Pope Alexander III and the Council of Tours. 
5 These numbers are extremely relevant when we remember that the Liber Extra, incorporated 
into the Corpus Iuris Cononici, remained the main reference of Canon Law until the beginning 
of the twentieth century. 
6 See Morris, The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church, p. 212. The author uses the term 
«rescript government». 
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arguments on this notion in order to trace the path of Roland’s educational 
background up to his ascendance to the Holy See in a continuous evolution of 
ideas in these texts7.
Until the second half of the 1970’s, no author questioned the idea that the 
magister Rolandus and pope Alexander III were the same person. Circum-
stantial issues and even misinterpretations or mistakes in the transcriptions 
of different manuscripts were repeated by several authors who confirmed the 
two “Rolandus” as being one8.
It was only in 1977 that John T. Noonan conducted for the first time in 
little over a century a study on the manuscript evidence which the authors 
had used to come to the conclusion that Alexander III had been the author 
of the Stroma and the Sententiae. His conclusion was that the manuscripts 
did not support the thesis and that magister Rolandus had been another per-
son who had possibly taught in Bologna, but who was not himself the pope 
Alexander III. Using some of the same arguments and adding other manu-
script and textual evidence, Rudolf Weigand also claimed that the author of 
the Summa could not have been the pope9. Since then, a total revision of his-
toriography has led authors to completely discard the thesis of the Bolognese 
background10. 
One of the consequences of this revision has resulted in statements such 
as the one from Colin Morris mentioned at the beginning of this section. Oth-
er authors have also adopted a much more reticent tone in ascribing any kind 
of juridical training to Alexander III. In the most recent volume published on 
Alexander III, Anne J. Duggan argues that 
Alexander’s decisions were issued only as a result of the growth of an appellate and 
consultative culture in which litigants appealed to the Holy See and bishops and their 
advisors consulted the Curia on problems and uncertainties as they arose; and the 
decretals acquired enduring legal force because they were collected and circulated 
and finally received into the compilations upon which academic lawyers found their 
teaching11. 
Ms. Duggan goes on to state that: «Alexander thus emerges not as a papal 
legislator re-fashioning the substance and functioning of the canon law, but 
as the president of a committee of legists»12. But can we really separate the 
actions of the papal curia from those of the pope? And is the fact that the legal 
force of the decretals comes from later incorporation to collections enough to 
invalidate the notion of an effort to organize Church Law? 
7 Pacaut, Alexandre III.
8 For more details on the development of this historiography and its misinterpretations, see 
Noonan, Who was Rolandus. 
9 Weigand, Magister Rolandus und Papst Alexander III.
10 Although Pacaut still accepted the idea that Alexander III was the Rolandus from Bologna in 
a text from 1994 for the Dictionnaire Historique de la Papauté (2003).
11 Duggan, Master of the decretals, p. 366.
12 Duggan, Twelfth-century decretal collections, p. 387.
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3. A “lawyer pope”?
In fact, calling Alexander III “lawyer pope” transfers to the twelfth centu-
ry a contemporary notion of law which can obscure our understanding of how 
matters of the juridical sphere were viewed and decided on. Even knowing to-
day that Alexander III was not the author of the Stroma or of the Sententiae, 
we cannot deny his contribution, through the works of the Papal See, to the 
formalization and structuring of canon law. 
This contribution can be seen, for example, through the image created of 
the pope by his own contemporaries. The descriptions made by several authors 
corroborate the notion that the juridical knowledge was an important element 
of Alexander’s abilities as pontiff. Robert of Torigny, abbot of Mount Saint 
Michel, for example, wrote around 1182 that Alexander III had a reputation 
for having been a theology professor («in divina pagina preceptor maximus») 
and for having knowledge of the canons and of Roman Law («et in decretis 
et canonibus et Romanis legibus precipuus»). He also stated that the pope 
dealt with and solved very difficult legal matters («nam multas questiones 
difficillimas et graves in decretis et legibus absolvit et enucleavit»)13. 
Boso, the author of Alexander III’s vita, characterized the pope as follows: 
Erat enim vir eloquentissimus, in divinis atque humanis scripturis sufficienter in-
structus et in eorum sensibus subtilissima exercitatione probates; vir quoque scho-
lasticus14. 
In the sequence, the author describes Alexander III’s moral attributes: 
vir siquidem prudens, benignus, patiens, misericors, mitis, sobrius, castus, et in ele-
emosynarum largitione assiduus, atque aliis operibus Deo placitis semper intentus15.
A part of the description made by Boso is certainly due to rhetorical for-
mulas that are repeated in the composing of other lives. Some moral char-
acteristics such as patience, kindness, sobriety, mercifulness and the gener-
osity in the giving of alms are constant topoi in the vitae. But two things are 
specific to Boso’s narrative of the life of Alexander III: first, the fact that he 
practically starts his story already listing the pope’s personal characteristics 
without even speaking about Roland’s early life (in the other lives written by 
Boso, he gives us elements about the childhood or adolescence of the popes, 
their religious background, and their family life). In Adrian IV’s (1154-1159) 
life, for example, the first four paragraphs describe Adrian’s trajectory from 
13 Robert de Torigny, Chronica, p. 298. Cited by Noonan, Who was Rolandus, p. 22.
14 Le «Liber Pontificalis». «Roland is a man of great eloquence, well enough learned in the 
writings both of human and divine authors, and skilled by careful practice in the understanding 
of them; moreover he is a man of the Schools»: translation by Ellis, Boso’s life of Alexander III, 
p. 43.
15 Ibidem: «thoughtful, kind, patient, merciful, gentle, sober, chaste, assiduous in the bestowing 
of alms, and ever intent on performing all the other good works that please God».
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adolescence to his election as pope before making a description of his charac-
teristics. In the case of Alexander’s life, the characteristics appear already in 
the first paragraph, indicating perhaps the importance of the pope’s “scholar” 
knowledge. On top of this, Boso also includes in his narrative the canons of 
the Council of Tours in 1163, breaking the sequence of the text. A possible in-
terpretation for the author’s choice is the political need (in face of the context 
of the schism) to show Alexander III as a pope who was a legislator and who 
could help structure the Church and normalize its power. 
Beyond the image created by twelfth-century writers, Alexander’s work 
itself provides plenty of examples of his use of Canon Law knowledge. In the 
composition of the decretals we can find numerous indications that the pope 
(or those working under his orders in the papal curia) knew Gratian’s work 
with some depth. In many of his decisions regarding marriage, for example, 
Alexander III makes explicit references to the Decretum, indicating that, even 
though he was not a commentator of Gratian, the pope was familiar with and 
used the canonist’s work. Discussing the ties of consanguinity that prevent 
marriage, Alexander III states that the seven degrees of separation must be 
respected: «Aeque enim, ut canones dicunt, abstinendum est a consanguineis 
uxoris, ut propriis, usque ad septimum gradum», reproducing the content of 
Gratian’s text: «Usque ad septimam generationem nullus de sua cognatione 
ducat uxorem»16. On spiritual affinity and co-parentage, the decretal even 
comments on differences between the texts presented by Gratian: 
canones secundum diversorum locorum consuetudines contrarii inveniuntur. Et licet 
primus canon exinde editus natos post compaternitatem adinvicem copulari prohibe-
at, alter tamen canon posterius editus primum videtur corrigere, per quem statuitur, 
ut, sive ante sive post compaternitatem geniti sunt, simul possint coniungi, excepta illa 
persona duntaxat, per quam ad compaternitatem venitur17. 
In another moment, discussing the matter of whether to believe the hus-
band or the wife, Alexander refers again to Gratian, declaring that 
quum in decretis habeatur expressum, quod, si vir dixerit quod uxorem suam cogno-
verit, et mulier negaverit, viri standum est veritati, unde praefato viro, qui dicit, se 
mulierem ipsam cognovisse, fides est adhibenda, si id firmaverit iuramento18.
16 X,4,14,1 («as the canons say, one must abstain from those consanguineous to one’s wife, as 
from one’s own blood relations to the seventh degree»). The citation is a reference to Gratian, C. 
35, q. 2-3, c. 1 («No one may take a wife related to him within the seventh degree»). The Liber 
Extra and Gratian’s Decretum are being used here from the 1582 Roman edition of the Corpus 
Iuris Canonici. 
17 X,4,11,1 («the canons and customs of different places contradict each another. The first canon 
included on this forbids those born after co-parentage arose to marry. Another canon, included 
after the first, seems to correct this; it provides that those born either before or after co-paren-
tage arose may marry, unless they are the person through whom it arose»). Citation of Gratian, 
C. 30 q. 3 c. 4 e 5.
18 X,4,2,6 («Decretum says explicitly that, if a husband claims to have known his wife, and his 
wife denies it, the man is presumed to be telling the truth»). Reference is to Gratian C. 33, q. 1, 
c. 3: «Si quis accepit uxorem et habuit eam aliquot tempore, et ipsa femina dicit quod nunquam 
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This series of elements points to a reinforcement of the idea that the Holy 
See under Alexander III was indeed deeply involved in legal matters. Are 
there also elements, then, to support Morris’s argument of a theologian pope?
An interesting topic to investigate the presence of theological arguments 
in Alexander’s writings regards the payment and collection of tithes, since the 
first main justification for this mandatory tax is associated to its very ancient 
practice already mentioned in the Old Testament, which constitutes one of the 
aspects of divine law. A theological knowledge was, therefore, essential for 
building an argument for the payment of tithes. Alexander III’s contribution 
to this matter is highly significant and has a great impact in all of the develop-
ment of the juridical discussions surrounding tithes.
The title of the Liber Extra dedicated to tithes (X, III, XXX), De decimis, 
primitiis et oblationibus, contains 35 chapters, of which 15 belong indisputa-
bly to Alexander III (chapters 5-19). There are also two chapters attributed to 
Adrian IV (chapters 3 and 4) but classified as being Alexander’s in the Regesta 
Pontificum – both addressed to Thomas Becket. But even if they were written 
by Adrian IV, it is important to remember that Alexander III was canceller of 
the papal curia doing the pontificate of Adrian IV. Therefore, Alexander III’s 
decretals represent the majority of the title, since the second most used pope 
is, once again, Innocent III, with eleven chapters19. 
Following the traditional justification of tithes through the Old Testa-
ment, the title begins with an extract from Jerome’s commentary on Ezekiel 
(45), concerning the offering of premises by the Levites. The second chapter, 
by Paschal II again uses the Levites, in order to attach the payment of tithes 
to God’s law. Alexander III also uses the argument of the divine institution of 
tithes, in chapter 14, when he states that tithes are instituted to the profit of 
God and not of men («Quum decimae non ab homine, sed ab ipso Domino sint 
institutae»). The idea that tithes are instituted by God since the beginnings of 
time and that their mention in the Old Testament proves their appurtenance 
to divine law, though not explicitly mentioned in the other decretals by Alex-
ander present in the title, explains, for example, the penalties imposed by the 
pope, particularly in cases of the usurpation or misuse of tithes by laymen. 
In chapter 7, for example, the pope recommends a condemnation to 
anathema in the case of laymen who calculate the value of their donation after 
extracting their expenses instead of doing so immediately after the reaping 
of the crop. According to chapter 19, which is an extract from the fourteenth 
canon from the Third Lateran Council, lay men who hold tithes and transfer 
coisset cum ea, et ille, vir dicit, quod sic fecit, in veritate viri constat: quia vir caput est mulieris». 
19 Throughout the thirteenth century, with the increasing number of legal texts and studies, 
the Liber Extra will remain the base reference for the decretalists, such as Henry of Suse. The 
disputes over the payment or exemption of payment from tithes occupied was a fruitful field for 
canonists, both in the solving of practical cases and in the elaboration of hypothetical cases to 
further elaborate juridical concepts. Alexander III and Innocent III, as the popes with the grea-
test production of legal sources via the decretals, were constantly referred to in the many works. 
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them to other laymen without rendering them to the Church should be denied 
a Christian burial. The most radical sentence, excommunication, is suggested 
twice, first in chapter 5 for those who refuse altogether to pay tithes for the 
product of mills, fishing, and wool and again in chapter 15 for those who pre-
tend to have a hereditary right over the collection of tithes.
Despite these examples of theological knowledge, when we analyze Alex-
ander III’s prescriptions regarding tithes, it is not exactly the biblical element 
that stands out, but a strong juridical tone with an awareness perhaps of the 
possibility of creating a type of legislation, or definition, for the Church’s do-
minium20.
The classic formula, «per apostolica scripta mandamus» (we order by 
apostolic decree), which is recurrent in the decretals, appears in six differ-
ent cases (chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 12), emphasizing the legislative tone of 
Alexander III’s prescription. The different forms of the verb compellere and 
compellare (as compel or appeal to, respectively) appear seven times. Other 
verbal forms, usually in the first person plural in the present, serve a similar 
purpose, such as: mandamus, statuimus, prohibemus, dedimus, diligimus. 
Thus we have the pope, using a plural form to indicate that he is the repre-
sentative of the Holy See (or of the Church as whole), prescribing actions to 
be taken by those requesting assistance and indicating the punishment which 
may be given in the case that these prescriptions are not followed. 
The possession, the use, the transfer and the mode of payment of tithes by 
laymen is clearly on top of Alexander’s concerns. We see then that the main 
focus in the fifteen decrees written by the pope and present in title 30 of the 
Liber Extra is not to define the nature of tithes or even to justify their collec-
tion on the basis of a divine prescription, but to ensure a realm of power, or a 
dominium, that is exclusive of the Church. In order to establish this control, 
it was necessary to turn to more juridical and legal formulas that could en-
sure the force of the prescription. The theological element clearly cannot be 
overlooked as it is an essential and mandatory part of the pope’s formulations 
and he uses it – even if only in an underlying way – when it seems to be the 
most effective means of making his point21. But we cannot deny either that 
the legal aspect, including the intention of legislating, is also of fundamental 
importance in view of the political and religious context of the mid-twelfth 
century. This does not make Alexander III necessarily a “lawyer pope”, but it 
does seem to indicate a preponderance of a normative impulse and an influ-
ence of Canon Law over theology in this specific form of communication, the 
decretal letters, by the Holy See at this period.
At the end of the brief study presented here – and which is far from being 
20 We refer here to the concept as proposed by Guerreau, Le féodalisme, un horizon théorique.
21 In fact, the studies of these two disciplines were intertwined, one fed on the other in order to 
produce the best argumentation. Elsa Marmursztejn shows how closely related law and theology 
were in scholastic discussions of the late twelfth to mid-thirteenth centuries: Marmursztejn, 
Débats scholastiques sur la dîme au XIIIe siècle.
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considered finished – we can summarize some of the major developments 
in the evolution of the research on Pope Alexander III. As is commonplace 
with many medieval characters, very little concrete biographical information 
was available to truly determine the educational background of Rolandus, the 
future Alexander III. Based on the discovery of manuscripts containing com-
mentaries on Gratian’s Decretum and a new legal text entitled Sententiae, 
scholars Friedrich Maassen and Heinrich Denifle seemed to have found the 
first works of this prolific writer, from before his ascension to the Throne of 
Saint Peter. For almost a century these assumptions went unquestioned and, 
in fact, guided the work of many scholars that followed. These writings sup-
posedly shed light into Alexander’s juridical influences, but they also brought 
about doubts and questions regarding apparent contradictions in the works 
from the two different periods. 
But the recognition of contradicting points of view between Rolandus, 
student of Law in Bologna, and Rolandus, the pope, did not imply in a ques-
tioning of the real authorship or of the scientific methodology used by Maasen 
and Denifle. Not even the clear speculative nature of the findings seemed to 
be a problem in the eyes of other nineteenth and even early twentieth centu-
ry scholars. As historiographical interests changed22, researchers dropped the 
discussion, Alexander III was relegated to a secondary role (always in the shad-
ow of Innocent III), and no more thought was given to the matter. This until 
John T. Noonan and Rudolf Weigand set about to demonstrate the flaws in the 
initial hypothesis of Alexander’s identity and conclude that, in fact, the writer 
(or writers) of the Stroma and the Sententiae was not the same person as Pope 
Alexander III. If at first this discovery did not seem to have caused great im-
pact, with time medievalists began to revise the most accepted notions about 
Alexander’s educational background and the nature of his writings.
As we have seen, this new vision about Alexander III along with a renewed 
interest for legal history made many historians question the juridical nature 
of the pope and of his writings. Could we consider the decretals a form of 
legislation? Did they have the force of law? Was Alexander III in fact a jurist? 
It has been our main goal in this article to support the juridical nature of 
Alexander’s decretals and the normative drive of his pontificate, even if we 
concede that it may be inappropriate to label him the “lawyer pope”. But it is 
equally important to suggest ways in which we can deal with the difficulties 
presented by the sometimes lacking, sometimes biased documents, particu-
larly in the case of the so-called “legal” or juridical sources. In light of the spe-
cific case which we presented – the papal decretals from the twelfth century – 
22 From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, religious and Church history tended to be re-
garded as a form of institutional history which carried specific political interests and obscured 
the understanding of society itself. New historiographical approaches shifted and the focus of 
researchers changed. The study of the papacy, for example, was in many cases relinquished. 
For more on the relationship between political ideologies and the study of religious and Church 
history, refer to Michel Lauwers’s article L’Église dans l’Occident Médiéval.
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it is imperative to take a different approach in order to better understand the 
motivations for the production and the effects of this kind of text in medieval 
society. Therefore, it is our belief that we may further explore the impact of 
Alexander’s decretals by thinking about them not as completed bodies of law, 
but as law under construction. 
The relevance of the decretals comes from the fact that they were com-
piled and incorporated into collections and used as manuals and guides to 
later canonists, legislators, and jurists. An important element in the devel-
opment of both law and theology in the twelfth century is the dependence on 
the written text, something that Michael Hoeflich and Jasonne M. Grabher 
call a «text-based study»23. Therefore knowledge developed through a small 
number of texts considered authorities and which were exhaustively studied 
and glossed. The texts were thus chosen for their pertinence and contribution 
to dealing with a certain point of law, for example, and the weight of their 
authority came from their inclusion in the collections. 
We can also change the focus from law to jurisprudence. Fransen, in 
saying that the decretals were not legislative but jurisprudential work, put 
two juridical systems in a scale of values. He stated that «les collections de 
décrétales ne sont rien d’autre que des recueils de jurisprudence choisie»24. 
But the nature of the study and development of Law in the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries depended on jurisprudence so this does not invalidate the 
role of decretals in the formation of Canon Law25. 
This element of jurisprudence can also be seen as part of the development 
of the studies of Canon Law at the schools, as a practical need to apply theo-
retical precepts. The decretals were compiled and organized in order to make 
the texts more accessible and useful for the resolution of practical problems. 
They reflect something that is part of the nature of medieval law which is a 
tension between the need to prepare for the practice and the need of an ap-
proach fully based on the authority of texts. So, even if Alexander III did not 
create a cohesive body of law throughout his pontificate, the production of 
the papal curia must be seen in its duplicity: initially fruit of a practical need, 
motivated by interests coming from outside the See, the decretals eventually 
become – through the compilations – symbol of authority, normative texts 
that legislated over and also created new situations26. 
23 Hoeflich, Grabher, The Establishment of Normative Legal Texts.
24 Fransen, Les Décrétales, p. 35.
25 For a discussion on the development of ius commune and jurisprudence, refer to: Hartmann, 
Pennington, Acknowledgements.
26 Pierre Bourdieu proposes that we look at the juridical field as a dialogue/conflict between 
different forces: «il faut prendre en compte l’ensemble des relations objectives entre le champ 
juridique, lieu des relations complexes et obéissant à une logique relativement autonome, et 
le champ du pouvoir et, à travers lui, le champ social dans son ensemble. C’est à l’intérieur de 
cet univers de relations que se définissent les moyens, les fins et les effets spécifiques qui sont 
assignés á l’action juridique»: Bourdieu, La force du droit, p. 14. If we think about this combina-
tion of fields, the variations that appear in the decretals can be seen not as an inconsistency of 
thought, but as a process typical and necessary for the creation of Law. 
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One example of this kind of behavior can be seen again in the dealing with 
tithes. Alexander III was aware of the repetition of certain questions posed 
to the Holy See and of the differences in responses, for example in the case 
of payment of tithes. In trying to solve the matter of whether one should pay 
tithes to the parish to which they are associated or to that where the lands are 
actually located, he states that 
quaestio temporibus praedecessorum nostrorum saepius mota fuerit, nec ab aliquo 
terminata, aliis intuitu territorii, aliis personarum obtentu asserentibus debere per-
solvi27. 
The solution proposed was to follow local custom depending on whether 
we were talking about one or two different episcopates. Mathieu Arnoux has 
interpreted this decretal as being an indication of how reticent the Church 
was to judge over matters related to the payment of tithes, never really elabo-
rating a true legislation on the subject28. But we can also see this as an effort at 
normalization by the papacy through mechanisms of negotiation among the 
different legal spheres existing in society, in a jurisprudential practice.
Alexander III established a precise limit to accepting customs in the case 
of payment of tithes: the territory of the dioceses. Custom could only inter-
fere where there was no precision or definition in patristic, Biblical or other 
legal authorities. The pope made it clear that there was no consensus among 
the different authorities regarding the location of payment of tithes. So, in 
this case, the most effective way to create the necessary normalization was 
through custom, as long as it did not overpower the authority of the parishes 
and dioceses. The acceptance of custom seems to be, then, not necessarily a 
sign of the disinterest in legislating, as Arnoux proposed, but it was, in fact, 
a strategy of ordination in a context that accepted a series of different legal, 
juridical, theological, and customary sources. 
Alexander III’s decretals specifically, and Canon Law in general, must be 
understood as multiple constructions imbued with a normative syncretism29. 
Therefore, the fact that we can find elements to support the thesis that Alex-
ander III was both a jurist and a theologian does not indicate any contradic-
tion, but is in reality in perfect alignment with the characteristics of the devel-
oping study and creation of medieval Law. Religious thought was jurisdicized 
and at the same time religion offered a new legitimacy to a normative model 
in accordance with the divine plan.
However, despite the presence of the theological knowledge in Alexander 
III’s work, we must recognize that the choice to compile decretals and use 
them in the formation of normative codes such as the Liber Extra comes, ev-
27 X,3,30,18 («this question has been frequently asked over time to our predecessors and never 
resolved, some saying that it should be paid according to the territory and others saying that it 
should be done according to the person»).
28 Arnoux, Pour une économie historique de la dîme. 
29 Mayali, De la raison à la foi, p. 482.
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idently, from the presence of legal and juridical terms, formulas, and theories 
in them. We must, then, look at Alexander III’s decretals not as a rigid code of 
unchangeable laws, but as a living law under construction – as all law should 
always be. Was Alexander III a “lawyer pope”? Probably not, but during his 
pontificate the Curia produced a massive number of documents which found 
in legal works – as well as in theological ones – the basis for their argumen-
tation and that would later be responsible for the establishment of a cohesive 
corpus of Canon Law.
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